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Naming, Knowing, Loving
by Dan Nichols

And the Lord God, having formed out of the ground all the beasts of the earth, and all the fowls of the air, brought them to Adam to see what he would call them: for whatsoever Adam called any living creature the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the cattle of the field.

—Genesis 3: 19-20       

I once shared a home with a young family. I had the upstairs, Jack and Jennie had the downstairs, and their two little boys had the run of the place.

The older child, John Kolbe, was four, and a particularly frequent visitor. Often his visits took a rambunctious form: a favorite game was Bad Man, in which I, in the starring role, would grimace and growl “I’m a Bad Man, and I’m gonna git you, boy!” This was followed by a chase scene and a lot of rowdy wrestling, giggles, and squeals.

But John had a reflective side, too. He would sit still for long spells, just hanging out, observing me as I went about my business, offering frequent commentary, and asking a lot of questions, most of which began with “why.” He was a bright and infinitely curious child, a good companion. One of the things that aroused his curiosity was the skull on my shelf.

Let me explain. When I was young and newly returned to the Church, I was caught up in the wild romance of Catholicism. Once, at dinner, when visiting a Carmelite monastery, I had been struck by the sight of a skull on the mantle of the refectory. Noticing that I was staring back at its hollow-eyed gaze, an old monk leaned over and whispered “It is to remind us of the brevity of life, that we may attend to our conversion.”

I had been, since I discovered them, an admirer of the wilder ascetics of our history—the grizzled old monks under the blazing desert sky, the naked Celtic hermits wandering the forests, Benedict in his cave—though this admiration no doubt stemmed from a misplaced sense of romance and adventure. I hadn’t actually tried much self-denial, mind you; hadn’t yet discovered what St. Therese called the “monotony of sacrifice.”

Still, I came home from the monastery and bought myself a skull. It wasn’t a real skull, of course, but it was a convincing replica. I had noticed John Kolbe’s fascination with the thing, but he never said anything about it until one spring afternoon, when he pointed to it.

“I know what that is,” he said. “It’s a head bone. One of those lives inside us.” It was a striking description, creepy and hilarious. But after my laughter subsided, it occurred to me that I had just witnessed something very profound: John, who didn’t know the word “skull,” had very vividly named a thing according to his knowing. He had, in fact, just fulfilled his vocation as a child of Adam.

The book of Genesis is an inexhaustible source of wisdom about man and his place and role in the cosmos. It is the primal text for any Christian (or Jewish or Mus­lim) anthropology. In this

beautiful poetic narrative we learn that man, made of earth and God-­breathed spirit, is created to tend the garden that is creation; that he is both Lord and servant of the material world, is to both “subdue” and “replenish” it; and that, made in God’s image, he is a sort of mediator, a bridge, a priest between the worlds of matter and spirit. And we learn that man is the namer of creatures.

To name a thing is to express something of its essence. It is a function of knowing. Just as Christ is the Logos, the Word, of the Father, perfectly revealing the Father and speaking worlds into existence, so man and woman, made in His image, in knowing and naming the created world, reveal it to itself and to other human persons, in a sense “speaking it” into existence conceptually. If we are, as Juli Loesch Wiley once put it, “the contemplatives of creation,” then this role of “the namer” of creation is a profound expression of our more fundamental role as “the knower” of both created beings and the uncreated Being from whom they spring.

This sense of the sacredness of the act of naming is not much understood or appreciated in the modern world, where names are a sort of shorthand, the meanings of which are seldom contemplated. Children, for example, are named for favorite celebrities or for the sound of the word and not for the meaning of the name.

I once met, at a subway station in Manhattan, a young Hare Krishna devotee. He was not long converted, and thus was more open to real conversation than most members of that sect. After discussing some of the usual controversies—reincarnation, vegetarianism, the nature of God—we had established a sort of rapport.

“What is your name?” I asked.

“Ramananda” he answered. “It means the love of God.”

“What was your name before you converted?” I asked He demurred. “That’s not important to me. Now I have a spiritual name.”

After some persistence, I got it out of him. Rather reluctantly he said, “My name was John.”

“John!” I exclaimed. “In Hebrew that means beloved of God!”

He was amazed, and had apparently never been told that his name was more than a pleasant sound.

It is important to remember that the modern world is unique in this attitude toward names, as it is unique in so many of its unquestioned, but aberrational ways. In pre-modern societies names express the essence of the person. Often, naming a child is postponed until his personality is expressed in his behavior, and even then one’s name may be changed several times in a lifetime to better describe the emerging personality or to describe one’s experiences.

Among the Navajo of the American Southwest a person was known publicly by one of these descriptive nicknames but he also possessed another, secret name, given at birth and unspoken even by his family, who would refer to the person within the family circle by kinship terms, “my mother’s brother’s third son” being more easily rendered in Navajo than in English. This secret name—c alled the “war name”—was considered a person’s personal property and was not necessarily even revealed to one’s spouse. Navajo culture thus serves as a preparation for the sort of secret intimacy that God desires with us and reveals in Jesus Christ: “to those who prove victorious, I will give the hidden manna and a white stone, a stone with a new name written on it, known only to the one who receives it.” (Revelation 2:17).

In Western traditional societies, though nicknames were common, people were named most often for some holy person whose particular virtues were admired or, especially among Calvinists, for the virtue itself. And while hardly as esoteric as the practice of the Navajo, traditional codes of etiquette retained a sense of the mystery and intimacy of the personal name. A young man, for example, might court a young woman for a good long while before he was granted permission to address her not as “Miss So-and-So” but by her given name. This signified in an obvious way that his affections were being returned. And one’s elders were always addressed by formal title and family name.

I am not saying that these social codes possess any absolute moral status; such cultural ways are obviously relative things. Personally, American that I am, formality makes me nervous, except in the liturgy. But such mores do emphasize something that can be obscured by the easy familiarity that once characterized American culture (in­creasingly replaced by in-your-face rudeness): there is a correspondence between naming and knowing. The name of a thing mysteriously expresses its being.

This correspondence exists, often, even in the sound of the name. I would imagine that in the Edenic Tongue this correspondence existed perfectly, that every word outwardly expressed the inner being of the named, that unfallen Adam’s knowing and loving of creatures was so thorough, so com­plete, that the names he bestowed on them emanated from their very essence.

In a fallen world, with its babble of broken tongues, our knowing and loving and naming are fractured and incom­plete, but still we often get it right, or close to right. This is true of words that sound like the thing described (“crash,” “boom,” “hiss”) but it exists in other words, words that don’t describe a sound but still manage to “sound” appropriate. Some may say this correspondence stems solely from our linking of words and beings, is a purely subjective construct that springs from habitual association. But I am convinced otherwise.

To take two creatures as ex­amples: is there not something in the word “bumblebee” that expresses bumblebeeness? Doesn’t the stut­tered “buh-buh-buh” of its repeated “b’s” connote something appropri­ate to the fat, fuzzy, awkward crea­ture it names? And doesn’t the word “wasp,” with its single sharp syl­lable, express waspness? Doesn’t it seem appropriate for the sleek, shiny, pointy creature it names? Can you imagine swapping the names, call­ing the big round bumblebee a “wasp” or calling the thin glossy arrow of a creature that is the wasp a “bumblebee?” To know the names of these creatures is to know something of their essence.

And while I will not get into the old debate in which the Dominicans hold that one must know a thing to love it and the Franciscans hold that one cannot know a thing until it is loved, it is clear that knowing and loving are closely related both to each other and to naming. (In the Old Testament “to know” meant “to make love with.”)

While these are not the musings of one who has studied linguistics, and are perhaps only the speculations of a layman with too much time on his hands, and while I am not a theologian, I can’t help applying these observations to the secularized post-industrial milieu in which we find ourselves in the waning years of the second millennium. I think, for example, of the average six-year-old in this culture: he knows by sight dozens, at least, of corporate logos, can spot the Golden Arches from a half mile away, but cannot name ten kinds of trees, or identify ten kinds of wildflowers that grow in his neighborhood. He knows the precise times of his favorite TV shows, but cannot tell you which phase the moon is in if you ask. He could lead you to his favorite video store but could not find the North Star at night.

I use the child as an example, but it is equally true of adults: we do not know the world in which we were created, the one of which we are a part. I would guess that most modern adults could not, if they saw a half moon, tell if it is waxing or waning, or be able to say how far the night is spent by its position in the sky. This is an astonishing thing, for the moon is the dominant reality of the night: its cycles and shapes were, to our ancestors, or even our grandparents, the familiar realities beneath which they lived and moved.

Too, most adults can name only a handful of trees, and then only by the broadest categories. The tree in the front yard is an oak, they may tell you, but would be hard pressed to tell you if it is a white oak or a red oak or a black oak.

I could go on listing such examples endlessly. We have, as a society, forgotten not some esoteric knowledge, but the most obvious realities of the real world. They have been forgotten because they have been banished; we have come to love and dwell in an artificial world of our own making.

As Cardinal Ratzinger said, a few years back, “In the world of technology, which is a creation of man, it is not the Creator whom one first encounters; rather man encounters only himself.”

It is, of course, getting worse. There are children who spend huge portions of their waking hours in solitary interac­tion with machines, who become thus alienated from human community, estranged from the natural world, and severed even from their own natures. The source of their childhood stimulations are soulless and illusory and the effects of the resulting brave new consciousness are beginning to be seen in the social fabric (and I am not even dealing with the content of such stimulation).

And as “virtual reality” becomes increasingly available we can only expect further dehumanization of the soul as more and more people become enslaved to this ultimate technological subjectivism. In the East, the term for the illusory world which keeps us from enlightenment is “samsara.” Virtual reality is, then, a sort of samsara within samsara, where the soul may wander in the dreaming ma­chine, freed even from contact with the world and other persons. The much-touted “information age” is well named. It is not wisdom which is increasing, nor even for the most part useful or necessary knowledge, but rather self-generating and self-referring information.

Yet the modern world in its pride looks down on traditional cultures as ignorant. How strange this is: the most primitive of peoples possessed more practical knowledge about the world around them than the most sophisticated moderns. They knew where they were. Such tribes as the Paiute of the Great Basin, living in one of the harshest environments on the planet and thus possessing a very stunted level of cultural development, knew, for example, the times of the solstices and equinoxes, the movements of the planets, and knew the desert around them and its ways so intimately that they flourished in a place where most of us would die in a few days. The truth is the opposite: it is we, the moderns, who are ignorant. Traditional societies, whether Christian or pagan, developed or primitive, knew the created world and lived within its cycles and limits. We are, on the other hand, disoriented (literally: how many people know instinctively the cardinal directions? But to traditional peoples “Which way is East?” is no more difficult than our “Is it on the left or the right?”)

It is not wise to persist in this unknowing, for the fact is that we are every bit as much a part of the natural world and just as dependent on it as the Paiute gathering his seeds. But we certainly don’t act like it.

I recently heard a preacher use the Scriptural phrase “the rain falls on the just and the unjust” to illustrate the fact that evil things happen to good people as well as bad. While his conclusion is true, this is a misuse of the Scripture: the meaning of the text is that good things happen to the evil and the good. Rain, particularly to a Middle Easterner, is a blessing. It is still (in moderation) a blessing, though I daresay that if the weather were democratically chosen it would be sunny and warm until we all died of starvation.

In fact, however much we’ve deceived ourselves, and however much we dwell in the technological dreamland, we are utterly dependent on the primal realities of earth and rain and sun and sky. That we do not know this world and cannot name it only means that we don’t love it. It is a sign of how profoundly we have persisted in the sinful refusal to respond to our original calling. And because the structures of techno­logical modernity are fragile ones, subject to natural cata­clysm and terrorist attack and eventual environmental dissi­pation, when our awakening comes it may come rudely indeed.­

 

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